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Abstract
A striking but unexplained pattern in biology is the promiscuous mating behaviour in socially monogamous species.
Although females commonly solicit extra-pair copulations, the adaptive reason has remained elusive. We use evolutionary
modelling of breeding ecology to show that females benefit because extra-pair paternity incentivizes males to shift focus
from a single brood towards the entire neighbourhood, as they are likely to have offspring there. Male-male cooperation
towards public goods and dear enemy effects of reduced territorial aggression evolve from selfish interests, and lead to
safer and more productive neighbourhoods. The mechanism provides adaptive explanations for the common empirical
observations that females engage in extra-pair copulations, that neighbours dominate as extra-pair sires, and that extra-pair
mating correlates with predation mortality and breeding density. The models predict cooperative behaviours at breeding
sites where males cooperate more towards public goods than females. Where maternity certainty makes females care for
offspring at home, paternity uncertainty and a potential for offspring in several broods make males invest in communal
benefits and public goods. The models further predict that benefits of extra-pair mating affect whole nests or
neighbourhoods, and that cuckolding males are often cuckolded themselves. Derived from ecological mechanisms, these
new perspectives point towards the evolution of sociality in birds, with relevance also for mammals and primates including
humans.
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Introduction
Females of many socially monogamous species mate with extra-
pair males while leaving it to their social mate to provide paternal
care [1]. Paternity data exist for more than 200 species of birds,
and for 90% of them extra-pair paternity is common [1]. The
advantage of such extra-pair mating is obvious for males who may
sire additional offspring without the cost of care, but why do
females actively solicit extra-pair copulations [2,3,4]? After all, a
main expectation is that the social male will withdraw his parental
care if his share of paternity becomes too low [2] – why would
females risk that [5]? Using evolutionary modelling, we show that
females who mate with neighbours incentivize males to cooperate
towards public goods. From a male perspective, multiple mating
and paternity uncertainty imply that their offspring may be spread
across several neighbouring nests; this makes it beneficial to focus
on the safety and productivity of the entire neighbourhood rather
than monopolizing resources for their own social nest. Since many
males share that perspective, it is in their self-interest to cooperate
with other males to provide such public goods more efficiently.
From a female perspective, the benefits of a cooperative
neighbourhood may outweigh the risk of lost care from her social
mate. Besides, males maintain incentives to stay around, although
their paternal investments may be redirected from care provided
at their own nest (such as feeding), towards neighbourhood
activities (such as vigilance, predator mobbing, or expulsion of
intruders).
Our explanation for extra-pair mating in birds is also a new
mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, one which may
sustain public goods among unrelated males in large groups. One
has to be cautious with semantics as the term ‘‘cooperation’’ has
different definitions depending on context. In discussions of mating
systems, ‘‘cooperation’’ is often used synonymously with ‘‘cooper-
ative breeding’’ [6], a particular mating system in which some
sexually mature individuals sacrifice all or some of their
reproduction and instead help more dominant individuals to
succeed reproductively. In this paper we will use ‘‘cooperation’’ in
a broader sense to denote costly and voluntary investments that
benefit others (beyond own offspring), and we will in particular
focus on cases where collective action is more efficient than
multiple individuals acting in isolation.
The discipline of cooperation theory has identified several
mechanisms whereby cooperation may evolve, including reciproc-
ity where favours are returned [7], kin selection benefiting relatives
[8], mutualism where there is no net cost to cooperation [9], and
group-level selection where cooperative groups are more produc-
tive and replace selfish groups [10]. Reciprocity has received
considerable attention [11] and may be efficient in pairwise
interactions [12]. In larger groups, stable cooperation based on
reciprocity requires assortative interactions so that cooperative
individuals meet more often than by chance [13,14], agents
capable of recognizing cooperative individuals [15,16], or
sanctioning of cheaters [17]. With many players, cooperative
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benefits need not arise through pairwise interactions but may
result from collective investments in a public good; this logic is
formalized in public goods games [18]. Here individuals perform
costly cooperative acts that produce a public good of greater value
than the sum of individual investments, but which anyone in the
group may benefit from, regardless of investment. The conflict
between the group, which would perform optimally if everyone
invested in cooperation, and the individual, who would be better
off by exploiting the public good while letting others pay the
cooperative investment, is at the heart of the tragedy of the
commons [19]. In some cases kin selection may stabilize public
goods [20], and in humans sanctioning institutions play a critical
role [21]. But in many cases cooperators are neither kin nor do
sanctioning institutions exist, from which Clutton-Brock [22]
concluded that ‘‘cooperation between unrelated individuals remains a
problem’’ and May [23] even argued that ‘‘the most important
unanswered question in evolutionary biology, and more generally in the social
sciences, is how cooperative behaviour evolved and can be maintained in human
or other animal groups and societies.’’
Before we detail our mechanism of how extra-pair mating may
cause evolution of cooperation it is worthwhile to briefly review the
main current explanations for why females in socially monoga-
mous relationships mate multiply. The first class of explanations
relate to genetic benefits, often referred to as indirect effects or
‘good genes’. Trivers [24] argued that because females generally
invest more in each offspring than males do, they should be choosy
about the mate’s quality while males should prioritize the quantity
of mates. The ‘good genes’ hypotheses state that since not all
females can be paired with the genetically best male, they seek
copulations with extra-pair males of superior genetic makeup to
increase offspring fitness [3,25]. A variant focuses on compatibility
between the paternal and maternal genome [26], as genetically
complementary males may sire heterozygous offspring [27] with
potentially higher fitness e.g. through improved immuno-compe-
tence [28]. By selecting partners with the right level of genetic
complementarity, females may avoid both out- and inbreeding
[29]. Theoretical studies suggest that the potential benefits of
genetic effects are most likely small [30], that heterozygosity of
extra-pair offspring may be overestimated [31], and that beneficial
effects to extra-pair half-siblings may be due to maternal effects
[32]. Meta-analyses conclude that genetic effects do not provide
benefits of the magnitude required to explain its widespread
occurrence [33–35]. Parker and Birkhead [36] argued that ‘‘given
the amount of effort that has been invested (…) and the lack of evidence that
females gain indirect benefits, it may be time to consider alternative
explanations.’’
In contrast to ‘good genes’ effects, females may mate with extra-
pair males to obtain direct or ecological benefits, for example to
ensure fertilization of their eggs [37], to obtain nuptial gifts from
several mates [38,39], or to recruit increased paternal care at her
nest [2,40–42]. Observations on red-winged blackbirds (Agelaius
phoeniceus) suggest an even wider cast of female-extra-pair mating.
In some populations, females solicit extra-pair copulations after
which a territorial male may allow extra-pair females to forage on
his territory; he may also defend her nest against predators but not
offer similar benefits to other females [43,44]. Females who
included feeding areas outside their social mate’s territory
increased the mean and reduced variance in foraging rates [45].
In the group-breeding alpine accentor (Prunella collaris) dominant
females interrupt copulations of subdominant females and thereby
mate with comparatively more males, as a consequence they
receive more help and achieve higher offspring survival [46,47].
Although such conspicuous exchanges of benefits with extra-pair
mates are rare [25], we argue that many forms of paternal care
potentially are overlooked because they involve investments
towards public goods away from the nest. By mating with extra-
pair males, females may construct a social network centred at her
nest, and which provides benefits to her but in a distributed and
diffuse manner. This is in line with Lima’s [48] review of the
abundant but poorly explained cooperative behaviours at bird
breeding grounds, and may be common in species where offspring
are dependent for a prolonged period [49]. Examples of public
goods in bird systems include vigilance [50], alarm calls [51],
calling networks [52,53], and predator mobbing [54]. In other
taxa, public goods include defence of burrows [55], patrolling of
joint territories [56], and sharing of large prey [57].
In this paper we illustrate how the problems of explaining extra-
pair mating and evolution of cooperation are two linked questions
with a common solution. One direct consequence of extra-pair
mating is that it causes paternity uncertainty, which may reduce
the risk of infanticide [58,59]. We extend this logic by noting that
paternity uncertainty incentivizes a male not only to abstain from
inflicting harm on a potentially direct descendant, but also to
cooperate and positively create public goods for the whole
neighbourhood since his offspring can belong to any of several
broods. From a set of models we derive hypotheses that align with
observations of abundant [48] and sex-specific [60] cooperative
behaviours at breeding sites, a positive correlation between
productivity of offspring mass and rates of extra-pair paternity
[61], a strong effect of predation mortality [56,62], the dominance
of neighbours as successful extra-pair sires [63,64], and aggrega-
tion during breeding despite potential for competition and conflict
[65].
Our models focus on socially monogamous birds because there
exists a rich literature on extra-pair mating for this taxon
[1,33,34,62]. Extra-pair mating is also common among fish
[49,66,67], also live-bearing ones [68]. The literature on mammals
more often refers to multi-male mating, which occurs widely for
example in rodents [69,70] and group-living primates [56,71].
The general theoretical insights thus have relevance for other taxa
than birds, so we will return to a general treatment of extra-pair
mating in the Discussion.
Models and Results
We use evolutionary models to analyse the influence of extra-
pair mating on cooperative behaviours. The models consider two
or more socially monogamous breeding pairs, and quantify fitness
and selection gradients on traits that determine individual
reproductive strategies. We assume no ‘good genes’ benefits but
focus only on how the ecological effects of care, provisioning, and
protection affect expected offspring survival. We present models
for two separate ecological mechanisms, each with specific trade-
offs. In our first model, there is competition between males over
territories that contain resources required for breeding, and the
key trade-off for males is between paternal care at the nest and
territorial defence. In a second model, males may engage in
collective vigilance and anti-predator behaviours, and the key
trade-off is between paternal care and investment in cooperative
defence. After showing results from each model we extend both
models by assuming a trade-off between an individual’s total
reproductive investment and survival, which introduces parental
conflict and the possibility of males to abandon nests.
Territorial competition over resources
The ecology of territorial breeding. In many species males
defend breeding territories and compete with their neighbours for
mates, breeding sites, and food resources [72,73]. Territorial
Extra-Pair Mating and Evolution of Cooperation
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 July 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 7 | e99878
defence requires vigilance to detect strangers, displays to signal
occupancy, and sometimes fighting to expel intruders. The time
and resources needed to sustain these activities are often traded off
against other activities such as foraging, resting, or parental care
[74]. Territorial behaviours may also increase the risk of mortality,
as combats may incur injury or fatality, or when vocalizations and
displays attract the attention of predators [48,51].
Territorial behaviours are most conspicuous while borders are
fluid and being negotiated [72]. Failing to challenge intruders may
lead to territory loss [75] and delayed trade-offs are likely, for
example if early investments into establishing a territory has
energetic costs that reduce survival or the ability to provide care
later in the season [74].
The model for resource defence. Our model focuses on
bird mating systems where males monopolize resources within
their breeding territory, and where these resources can be
exploited by the male and female to provision their young. Males
can thus invest in territory defence d , as well as in offspring care
cm, which is directed at the nest and includes provisioning and
protection of the young. Females lay a fixed number of eggs at a
cost r0 and invest in maternal care cf at the nest. For simplicity we
assume linear trade-offs between these activities, so reproductive
investment is given as rm~dzcm and rf~r0zcf for males and
females, respectively. We start with the assumption that
rm~rf~1, i.e. that males and females have a fixed total
investment in reproduction. The amount of resources a male
monopolizes is modelled as a tug-of-war, and thus depends on a
focal male’s investment in territory defence d ’ and the defence
strategy d of his neighbour(s), plus competitive pressure l from
non-resident floaters. In the simplest case we consider two pairs;
then the effect of resource defence on offspring survival is
q(d ’Dd)~
d ’
d ’zdzl
 a
:
The relative investment in territorial defence hence determines
the proportion of resources that the focal male controls and a
scales the influence of resources on offspring survival. The effect of
care on offspring survival depends on contributions from each
parent, i.e. f (cm,cf )~c
c
mzc
c
f . Our argument is not particularly
sensitive to the shape of these functions, but we generally assume
diminishing returns or a linear effect of investments, i.e.
a,c [ S0,1. Investments in care benefit offspring directly, whereas
the value of resource defence by the male depends also on the
defence strategies of neighbouring males. The expected number of
surviving offspring w is our fitness measure, where
w~f (c’m,cf )q(d ’Dd) with prime denoting the focal male’s strategy
(see Supporting Information S1). Note how care at the nest and
access to resources need to be balanced to achieve high offspring
survival.
Extra-pair paternity and fitness. Consider first a single
breeding season and only two neighbouring nests. With no extra-
pair paternity, male fitness wm is identical to female fitness wf .
Average offspring survival would be maximized if males cooper-
ated and refrained from aggression, and instead invested heavily in
care. In effect, this endpoint of the model corresponds to males
defending only external borders of a joint resource territory to
keep non-territorial floaters at a distance. This cooperative
solution is evolutionarily unstable because a territorial male who
aggressively attains a larger share of the resources will have higher
fitness. Strong territorial defence will therefore spread and
dominate in the population (see Fig. 1).
Extra-pair paternity may alter this outcome. If each male sires a
proportion x of the offspring in the neighbour’s nest, male fitness
wm now depends on offspring production both in his social nest
wWP and in the neighbouring nest wEP:
wm~(1{x)wWPzxwEP:
We first assume that males have the same probability of gaining
and losing paternity (this assumption is relaxed in the pairwise
invasibility plot of Fig. 2); the number of expected offspring is
therefore the same but how offspring are distributed across nests
has changed. From a male perspective, neighbouring-nest fitness
becomes more important when x rises. For a male, monopolized
resources benefit his offspring in the home nest, but at the same
time this takes resources away from his extra-pair offspring in the
neighbouring nest. A female who mates with a neighbour
therefore incentivizes this extra-pair male to relax territorial
defence so that resources flow to his potential extra-pair offspring
in her nest. Now facing a less aggressive neighbour, the female’s
social mate would gain more resources if he maintained the same
territorial behaviour. Because of the trade-off between territorial
defence and care, however, his fitness is optimized by reducing
aggression, but only so much that he still secures slightly more
resources than before. This has the important consequence that it
frees time for care. By parallel reasoning, the neighbouring female
will benefit from recruiting an extra-pair mate too, which may
reduce territory defence even further (see also Supporting
Information S2 for an interpretation of the resource territoriality
trade-off in terms of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game).
Evolutionarily stable strategies and invasion
analysis. For a given extra-pair paternity (EPP) rate we find
the best male strategy for care and territorial defence using
invasion analysis [76,77] (see also Supporting Information S1).
This approach assumes a population where all individuals follow
the same strategy (termed ‘‘resident’’) and considers the growth
rate of a rare strategy (referred to as ‘‘mutant’’ and denoted with
prime). By making small changes to the strategy for male
investment in care and territorial defence we calculate growth
rate of this mutant strategy and iteratively replace it with one that
does better, until a strategy that cannot be invaded by any mutant
strategy is reached; this is considered to be the best male response
to a given EPP level. We then repeat this for many EPP values to
show how males should optimally respond to different female
mating behaviours.
To test whether extra-pair mating can evolve as a female-driven
strategy we compare two nests where one of the females follows a
mutant extra-pair mating strategy x’~xzDx that results in a
marginally higher EPP level than in the resident population; if she
experiences a net fitness increase it is assumed that genes for that
behaviour can spread and establish themselves in the population.
When testing mutant EPP strategies, male extra-pair paternity is
not symmetrically distributed among the neighbouring males: the
social mate experiences increased levels of cuckoldry whereas
neighbours benefit from higher EPP. Using the approach
described above we find the male strategy that is the best response
(denoted with asterisk) of both the within dWP and extra-pair d

EP
mate of the female mutant. This implicitly assumes that males use
female behaviour or other cues to assess within- and extra-pair
paternity [78], and that they facultatively adjust paternal care at
the nest [2,79] in response to their mate’s mating behaviour (i.e.,
males respond by evolved phenotypic plasticity). We then calculate
the selection gradient on x, and through repeated iterations make
small changes to the resident female strategy in the direction of a
Extra-Pair Mating and Evolution of Cooperation
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Figure 1. Extra-pair paternity (EPP) favours reduced territorial aggression between neighbours. (A) Evolutionarily optimal male
investment strategy in territory defence (green area) versus care (orange) as function of EPP. (B) Average fitness as a function of paternal investment.
Increasing EPP levels climb the fitness landscape until the ESS (w) at the cooperative solution (white circle) (r0 =0; rf = rm =1; other parameters as in
Table 1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099878.g001
Table 1. Variables and parameters.
Symbol Description Value
Strategy variables
cf Maternal care (subscript ‘f’ indicates female)
cm Paternal care (subscript ‘m’ indicates male)
d Male investment in territorial defence
k Male investment in collective vigilance and defence
x Rate of extra-pair paternity
Functions
f Effect on offspring survival of parental care
g Total benefit for offspring survival of being in a group
mf, mm Total annual mortality rate
q Effect on offspring survival of resources defended in territory
rf, rm Total reproductive investment
wf, wm Expected fitness, proportional to lifetime production of fledglings
Ecological and life-history parameters
a Cost of aggregation 0.04
h Rate at which group benefits increase with cooperative investment 0.5
l Competitive pressure from floaters per resource area 0.1
m0 Annual basal mortality rate Varied
mr Annual mortality rate due to reproductive investment at r~1 0.1*; 0.25**
n Number of breeding pairs in neighbourhood Varied
u Summed group investment in cooperation at which the effect
of collective defence increases most rapidly
2.0
a Exponent in function q (effect of resources) 0.7
b Exponent in functions mm and mf (mortality cost of reproductive investment) 3*; 1**
c Exponent in function f (effect of care) 0.7
*Resource territory model; ** Collective vigilance and anti-predator defence model. (See online Supporting Information S1 for a comprehensive table of variables and
parameters.).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099878.t001
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positive gradient. Given the model and assumptions it makes, we
define the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) as the male and
female strategy set where mutants of either sex no longer can
invade.
Results from resource territory model: EPP reduces male
investment in territorial defence. Increased levels of EPP
select for male strategies with more care and less neighbourhood
aggression (a ‘dear enemy’ effect) (Fig. 1A). From a female
perspective, reduced territoriality frees time for paternal care,
which benefits her offspring. There is thus a positive selection
gradient on female extra-pair mating behaviour that leads to
higher EPP, provided that males respond to variations in female
EPP levels (Fig. 2A). As a result, the mating strategies climb the
fitness landscape towards the cooperative solution (Fig. 1B). In the
extreme case where the two males have equal proportions of
within-pair and extra-pair offspring, each male has the same
interest in both broods, resources are equally distributed but
defended less aggressively, and the cooperative solution has
become the best male response (Fig. 1B).
Despite the benefit of reduced aggression as males gain
paternity in several nests, each male has a strong incentive to
protect paternity in his own nest (indicated by the strong fitness
gradient when moving parallel to the y-axis in Fig. 2C,D). In the
model we assume that females fully control the level of EPP,
although males that guard their mate may constrain female extra-
pair mating behaviour [80,81]. This may weaken female
incentives for engaging in extra-pair mating, reduce EPP levels,
and prevent evolution from reaching the cooperative solution.
Figure 2. Fitness consequences of female extra-pair mating. (A) Pairwise invasibility plot showing relative fitness of a focal female with a
different extra-pair paternity (EPP) level than the population mean. For any EPP level along the x-axis, a female with higher EPP than the population
mean (above the black diagonal) has higher fitness and can invade and replace the dominant strategy in the population. Arrows show a hypothetical
sequence of invasions until the ESS (w) is reached when EPP is 50%. (B) Female extra-pair mating has minor consequences for the neighbouring
female, who with these parameters actually benefit too and should therefore not oppose the behaviour. (C) The social mate of the focal female
experiences a severe drop in fitness if she increases her level of EPP, and one can expect counterstrategies such as mate guarding to prevent
paternity loss in his social nest. (D) As expected, the highest fitness benefit accrues to the neighbouring male, who gets extra offspring that two
neighbours will provide the care for. Above sperm, his contribution is to relax territorial defence to allow some resources to flow in the direction of
his extra-pair offspring.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099878.g002
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The effect of reduced territorial aggression is not restricted to a
neighbouring pair but may be extended to an entire neighbour-
hood (see Supporting Information S1). Male incentives for
aggressive defence are, however, stronger in larger neighbour-
hoods because the reduction of one male’s defence will allow
several neighbours to grab a larger territorial share; females
therefore need to push EPP higher to attain similar benefits.
Collective vigilance and anti-predator defence
The ecology of collective anti-predator behaviours. Breed-
ing birds often engage in cooperative predator defence: they take
turns being vigilant, collectively mob predators, or elicit alarm calls
that warn others of approaching dangers [48,54]. A comprehensive
study of colonial breeding in bank swallows (Riparia riparia) found
multiple costs of group living while the only benefit supported by their
data was collective anti-predator defence [82]. Cooperation over
shared vigilance [83] and collective defence [82,84] is often more
efficient than individual investments and frees time for other activities
such as foraging and care. Alarm calls may, however, give away the
location of the caller and possibly that of its nest [51], and mobbing
may increase risk of injury or death of individuals that participate
[54]. Alarm calls and mobbing are thus risky for the individual but
beneficial for all group members; an ecological setting similar to
public goods games where a common good, shared by a group of
individuals, increases with cooperative investments but involves costs
to individual cooperators [19].
The model for collective vigilance and defence. The
general assumptions are similar to those of the resource territory
model where males and females allocate their reproductive
investment between different activities. Here we let male
investment in cooperative behaviours k conflict with provisioning
and care for offspring at the nest cm, so rm~kzcm. A male who
cooperates in collective defence will therefore increase the public
good, but at a cost of reduced care in his own nest. We assume that
the public good increases with the sum of cooperative investments
from all males in a group, and that all group members benefit
regardless of their investment. Group members may also
experience aggregation costs such as intensified food competition,
elevated conflict levels, and higher susceptibility to parasites and
diseases. The net group effect g for a group of n pairs where all
males invest k in collective anti-predator defence except for one
focal male (denoted by prime) who invests slightly more
k’~kzDk is hence:
g(kzDkDk,n)~
exp {a(n{1)ð Þ
1z exp {h nkzDk{uð Þð Þ ,
where the aggregation cost increases with the number of
neighbours and the interference strength a. The cooperative
benefit increases with the sum of investments in collective defence
(Fig. 3), and changes most rapidly when the sum of collective
investments is close to u.
The evolutionary dilemma is that collective anti-predator
defence is more efficient than solitary actions, but each male has
incentives to prioritize provisioning and care for offspring in his
nest and let others invest in cooperative defence. Again, females
can change the evolutionary outcome by extra-pair mating. In a
group of n pairs, the focal male who invests slightly more in
cooperation than the rest, has fitness:
w’m~g(kzDkDk,n) (1{x)f (cm{Dk,cf )zxf (cm,cf )½ :
More cooperation (kzDk) will increase the public good (g) and
benefit all his offspring, whereas reduced care (cm{Dk) only
affects the within-pair offspring in his own nest. As the proportion
of extra-pair young increases with higher x, the male experiences
the full benefit of a given cooperative investment, but the cost
affects only his social nest and is reduced. As before, the fitness of
the mutant strategy is related to that of the resident population and
the best male strategy is found where no w’m is larger than the
fitness wm of the resident strategy.
Results from collective vigilance and anti-predator
defence model: Extra-pair mating increases cooperative
investments. Extra-pair mating incentivizes males to invest in
cooperative behaviours. This happens because the cost in a male’s
social nest affects both his genetic offspring and extra-pair young
sired by others, whereas his cooperative investment benefits all his
offspring independent of location. As the proportion of within-pair
offspring in his own nest decreases, the threshold for engaging in
cooperation is lowered. The evolutionarily stable male strategy
involves higher investments in collective defence and less care
directed towards his social nest, which adds up to a benefit to the
whole neighbourhood (Fig. 4A). Females benefit from recruiting
extra-pair mates because they will cooperatively protect her nest,
but this comes at the cost of reduced investment from her social
mate as he gains less paternity. Although females receive less help
with care, they experience a net fitness benefit because offspring
survival increases. As EPP levels increase and trigger higher
cooperative investments by males, cooperation can be stable also
in groups larger than two pairs and thus become more efficient.
Extra-pair mating may thus be a mechanism to extend the social
neighbourhood with a positive effect on fitness, as shown by the
fitness landscape in the background of Figure 4B where offspring
survival peaks at intermediate group sizes and relatively high levels
of extra-pair paternity.
Extending models with trade-offs between current and
future reproduction
Males may respond to cuckoldry by decreasing current
reproductive investments if alternative reproductive opportunities
exist [5,84]. We include this possibility by allowing males and
females to allocate reproductive investments across several
breeding seasons. Reproductive investment in one season may
influence future reproductive events, for instance by reducing the
probability that a parent will survive to the next breeding season
[85–87]. This trade-off makes the game between the male and the
female more pronounced and there is room for parental conflict
with potential consequences for future breeding attempts and
longevity. We assume that the risk of mortality increases with
higher reproductive investments r, from a baseline mortality m0:
m~m0zmrr
b,
where mr and b scale the relative cost of current investments. Male
and female reproductive strategies affect their expected longevity,
and mortality may also reduce current reproductive output if one
of the parents dies during the breeding season. If females invest
more in reproduction than males, they have lower survival
probability, which affects the operational sex ratio and may
intensify male-male competition for mates (see Supporting
Information S1).
Results from extended models: Extra-pair paternity
declines with expected longevity. When longevity increases
and future breeding becomes more likely, both males and females
evolve reduced annual reproductive investment. Females benefit
Extra-Pair Mating and Evolution of Cooperation
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from EPP only as long as reduced aggression over resources
increases male investments in care (resource territory model; Fig. 5,
Supporting Information S1) or when the benefits of male-
produced anti-predator defence outweigh the costs of reduced
paternal care (collective vigilance and defence model; Fig. 6).
Males who lose paternities in the home nest reduce their
reproductive investment more than others; females therefore need
to balance the cost of reduced care against the benefits they can
achieve through EPP and male-male cooperation. In model for
collective vigilance and anti-predator defence, joint protection
from neighbours makes it easy for cheating males to opt out of the
cooperative defence by reducing current investments or even
abandoning the nest. This is an obvious cost for females and EPP
levels are consequently predicted to decline and approach zero as
longevity increases (Supporting Information S1), which is in line
with observations [62] and general theory [42,88]. Note that the
model does not assume any carry-over effects of reproductive
investments, so any surviving individual has the same probability
of being mated, which may have implications for the level and
stability of cooperation.
Discussion
In this paper we have presented a new mechanism for the
evolution of cooperation towards public goods. The logic is simple.
When a male has all his offspring in a single nest, evolution favours
reproductive strategies that focus his attention there: by competing
with others to maximize his share of resources; or by cheating on
public goods and withdrawing from cooperative investments,
thereby causing a tragedy of the commons. Female extra-pair
mating has the important role of altering the incentives for males:
because males potentially have offspring in several nests, natural
selection favours males who cooperate towards the productivity
and security of the entire neighbourhood. This may include
sharing of resources, reducing aggression, being vigilant, alarming
of dangers, and defending the neighbourhood rather than the
single nest. Cooperation thus evolves from individual male and
female self-interests, making the whole neighbourhood safer and
more productive.
Paternity and paternal investment
Effects of paternity uncertainty. It has been noted that
multi-male mating confounds paternity and thus prevents males
from committing infanticide of offspring that are potentially theirs
[58]. Hrdy [89] extended this logic in the context of allo-parental
care; her focus was how high male mortality in many hunter-
gatherer societies makes it unlikely that a paternal care-giver will
survive for the whole duration of offspring dependence. Extra-pair
mating may then serve a bet-hedging function, as mothers can
enlist support from other males in case her partner dies. Stacey
[40] suggested a more direct causation, in that females through
extra-pair mating may recruit multiple males to help with care for
the female’s offspring. This thinking was central also to the eye-
opening studies on the intricate and variable mating systems of the
dunnock [2,41]. The common logic is that paternity uncertainty
may not only prevent something negative but may also produce
something positive. Our approach extends this perspective by
showing mechanisms through which neighbourhood cooperation
among unrelated males may evolve.
Paternal reproductive investment beyond care at the
nest. Studies of paternal care in birds have focused on
quantifiable male activities at the nest; these typically include
brooding, feeding, and offspring protection [2,90]. Behaviours at
the nest need not be the only activities a male engages in to
maximize the fitness of his offspring. Lima [48] pointed to many
cooperative behaviours at bird breeding grounds that resemble
public goods but which have received little attention, including
alarm calling [51] and mobbing [54,82,91]. These are seldom
regarded as parental care investments, but as long as cooperative
behaviours benefit potential offspring and are costly to the male in
terms of energy, survival, or opportunity, they should be included
in the budget of reproductive investment [40,56].
Although paternal contributions away from the nest are central
to our models, it is important to note that the cooperative benefit
and its consequences for care differ between our two models. In
the model for collective vigilance and anti-predator defence, extra-
pair mating causes individual males to provide less paternal care at
their social nest and instead take part in neighbourhood activities
that produce a public good, such as vigilance and mobbing. This is
in contrast to the resource territory model, where extra-pair
Figure 3. Assumptions of the model for collective predator defence. (A) The relative effect of care on offspring fledging success is the same
as for the resource territory model, and is the sum of effects of male and female care. (B) The effect of cooperative predator defence is modelled as a
sigmoid function of cumulative investments in the group. The thick green line is the effect if the resident strategy, i.e. the mean level of investment in
the group k~nk=n, were to change. The thin black line is the effect of one focal individual in a group of n=8 changing his investment k’~kzDk in
cooperative defence, assuming that the remaining group members follow the resident strategy with k =0.5. (C) Fitness is the product of the orange
and green lines from panels A and B, respectively, and peaks (w) at intermediate values. (a= 0.02; rf = rm = 1; other parameters in Table 1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099878.g003
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mating causes more paternal care at the nest because paternity
spread takes away reasons for aggressive resource monopolization.
Reproductive conflict and the mating game
At breeding grounds, both competition and cooperation with
others influence individual pay-offs. The male and female of a
mated pair shares a common interest in raising viable offspring,
but each may benefit from having the other investing more in care
and protection [24]. Among males, the traditional view is that
conflict dominates [92], but a consequence of the mechanisms in
our models is that cooperation among unrelated males emerges.
This brings with it new and sex-specific lines of conflicts, where
males may adjust care investments in response to mating access or
paternity [2,41]. Mating with multiple males may be a mating
strategy by which females trigger help from additional males [40],
and they may hence compete with other females to channel
benefits produced by males towards their own nest. Although there
is intense competition among males for matings, the game changes
once eggs have been fertilized as neighbourhood cooperation may
be favoured by individual-level selection.
Female mating tactics. Our models show that the level of
extra-pair mating may evolve as a female-driven strategy, which is
corroborated by several empirical observations: females are
observed to actively seek extra-pair copulations in many species
[2,3,4]; forced copulation is not common in birds [93]; and in one
particularly well-studied population of song sparrows (Melospiza
melodia) the heritability of male extra-pair success is virtually none
[94] whereas the proportion of extra-pair young in a female’s
brood shows significant heritability [95]. These lines of evidence
support the view that extra-pair mating is at least partly under
female control, but to what degree may vary even among
populations of the same species [96]. Females can also control
fertilization through post-copulatory selection and sperm compe-
tition [25], including ejection of sperm from previous matings [2].
If females synchronize their fertile period, males experience a
stronger conflict between mate guarding and soliciting of extra-
pair copulations, which likely makes it easier for females to control
their mating activity [41,97].
Male mating tactics. To evolve as a female-driven strategy,
extra-pair mating has to channel more benefits towards a female’s
nest than achieved by less promiscuous females. This requires
phenotypic plasticity in the male response to the shift of paternity
distribution, and therefore that they have some information on
which to act. In birds, males can rarely recognize their own
offspring [78], but they may use information about their mate’s
behaviour to assess within-pair paternity. When it comes to extra-
pair paternities, it is a safe assumption that males have information
about their own extra-pair mating activity and can use that to
assess the likely distribution of offspring in the neighbourhood.
Although our models assume that males have full information,
preliminary models in which extra-pair males have more accurate
information than social males predict that extra-pair mating may
evolve more easily and to higher levels.
The models have for simplicity omitted several important
behaviours. For example, males may attempt to pre-empt
paternity losses through mate guarding or compete to sire extra-
pair offspring [98]. It is in each male’s interest to protect paternity
in his own nest, regardless of the cooperative benefit that follows
from paternity being spread across different nests (consider the
very steep drop in fitness of the social male if his female increases
extra-pair mating in Fig. 2C). Whether mate guarding, frequent
within-pair copulation, increased advertisement, or extra-pair
mating effort evolve depends on how males best can allocate their
reproductive investment [98]. Such strategies may bring the
realized extra-pair paternity level in the population below that
predicted by our models.
Model predictions
Our models only caricature the complex behavioural interac-
tions at bird breeding grounds, but even from this simplified
evolutionary game several general patterns emerge. It is worth
stressing that the mechanisms we propose do not preclude the
simultaneous operation of ‘good genes’ effects, infertility insurance,
or other mechanisms that may cause extra-pair mating or
cooperation.
Prediction: Extra-pair mating increases fitness of whole
nests and neighbourhoods. A key prediction from ‘good
genes’ hypothesis is that extra-pair offspring (EPO) should have
Figure 4. Extra-pair paternity (EPP) promotes cooperative anti-
predator defence. Males trade-off paternal care and cooperative
predator defence. (A) As EPP increases, males cooperate more because
costs of reduced paternal care affect only within-pair young whereas
cooperative defence protects all offspring. (group size n= 5; rf = 1.0 of
which egg investment r0 = 0.3; see Table 1 for other parameters). (B)
Fitness landscape as a function of neighbourhood size and male
cooperative investment. With no EPP the evolutionary outcome is
solitary breeding with no cooperation (lower left corner). EPP increases
along the black line (dots mark each 10%). Short-lived species reach the
cooperative solution (white circle) for high EPP levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099878.g004
Extra-Pair Mating and Evolution of Cooperation
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 July 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 7 | e99878
higher fitness than their within-pair (WPO) half-siblings. Conclu-
sions from detailed population studies are variable: sometimes
there is no difference between WPO and EPO or even a survival
cost to EPO [99], sometimes there is a benefit to some EPO
[63,100], and in other cases EPO show more consistent benefits
[28]. Meta-analyses that integrate across studies conclude that
genetic benefits to EPO are weak or absent in most cases and are
unlikely to be the main driver behind the widespread occurrence
of extra-pair mating [33,34].
In contrast, it follows from our mechanism that extra-pair
mating improves fecundity or survival of whole nests or
neighbourhoods. The most striking observation of this is not from
birds but from a rodent, the Gunnison’s prairie dog (Cynomys
gunnisoni), for which there was a direct relationship between litter
size and the number of males the female had copulated with [101].
In this species, groups of multiple males and multiple females share
a network of underground burrows, and females forage above-
ground, frequently beyond territory borders. This could be
consistent with our model for resource territories, although the
paper does not report territory location for the extra-pair males.
To our knowledge, bird data has only rarely been analysed for
whole-nest effects in a similar way. Predator mobbing is common
in tree swallows (Tachycineta bicolor), and here older and experi-
enced females had more extra-pair sires [102], higher hatching
success [103], and larger clutch size [104]. In dark-eyed juncos
(Junco hyemalis) extra-pair offspring had higher fitness: sons through
extra-pair offspring and daughters through increased fecundity
[100], which is as expected from our theory if female extra-pair
mating and male cooperative investment are heritable traits. It
would be interesting to see further analyses of whole-nest and
neighbourhood effects and to contrast populations of the same
species differing in the level of extra-pair paternity.
Prediction: Neighbours dominate as extra-pair
sires. We predict that extra-pair copulations should be
predominantly with neighbours who can share resources, be
vigilant, or help with nest defence. Where spatial patterns in extra-
pair sires have been reported, neighbours dominate
[27,61,64,105,106–109]. In song sparrows territory neighbours
sired 95% of the extra-pair young in a spread-out mainland
population [108] and 88% of all EPO in a dense island population
[107]. There was a tenfold difference in territory size between
these sites, suggesting that being a neighbour may be more
important than distance itself, a conclusion also reached for reed
buntings (Emberiza schoeniclus) [109].
The prevalence of local extra-pair sires is not readily explained
by genetic benefits, although it has often been hypothesized that
frequent encounters make assessment of genetic quality easier or
allow more opportunity for copulation [80]. Counterarguments
could be i) that extra-pair copulations with distant sires likely
would reduce the probability of being detected; and ii) that several
Figure 5. Extra-pair paternity (EPP), territorial defence, and longevity. Annual reproductive investment r evolves in a trade-off with survival.
(A) EPP is common in short-lived species (grey) and drops with increasing life-expectancy (black line, parameters in Table 1). The pattern is robust but
the predicted EPP level depends on ecological parameters, e.g., mortality cost of reproduction (green, mr =0.05 and mr =0.2 for thin and bold line,
respectively; blue, b= 2 and b=4), and the proportion of adult mortality experienced during breeding (orange, b= 0.1 and b= 0.5). (B) For short-lived
species, the ESS involves high EPP, reduced defence, and elevated care. With increasing longevity, the evolutionary outcome is low or no EPP (black
line) and more territorial defence. (C) Fitness landscape for combinations of male care and defence strategies in a short-lived species (longevity 0.5
breeding seasons; m0 =1.59). Higher EPP results in less territorial defence, but the evolutionarily stable care strategy (w) is below that of the
cooperative solution (#).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099878.g005
Figure 6. Longevity reduces EPP levels and male-male
cooperation. Fitness landscape as a function of neighbourhood size
and male investment in cooperative defence. With no EPP the
evolutionary outcome is solitary breeding with no cooperation (as in
Fig. 4B). As EPP increases along the coloured lines, the best male
strategy (w) approaches the cooperative solution (white circle) in short-
lived species (dots mark each 10% increase in EPP). In more long-lived
species males prioritize future reproduction and high EPP levels are not
beneficial to females; the best male strategies are found further away
from the cooperative solution (baseline mortality; m0 is 1.69 (black), 0.83
(green), 0.49 (blue), and 0.30 (red)).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099878.g006
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studies report higher heterozygosity for EPO with long-distance
sires but no such effect for EPO with neighbours [63,110]. The
latter observation suggests that while compatibility benefits may
explain extra-pair mating with non-neighbours, there is a need to
look beyond genetic benefits to explain the dominance of local
extra-pair sires.
Prediction: Cuckolding males are often cuckolded
themselves. It is expected from our models that recruiting
contributions from neighbouring males may enhance fitness of a
female’s brood even if she is socially paired with a high-quality
male. This aligns with the common observation that males who
are successful at gaining extra-pair paternity are no better than the
rest at defending paternity in their home nest [64,106,108,111],
which is not easily explained by ‘good genes’ hypotheses.
Prediction: Males show ‘dear enemy’ effects during the
breeding season. Many territorial species are less aggressive
towards neighbours than strangers [112], and such a ‘dear enemy’
effect is a direct outcome of our resource territory model. The
model predicts a ‘dear enemy’ effect in the period from
fertilization to fledging, while the rest of the time there might be
intense competition over mates, fertilizations, and resources. This
was found in the skylark (Alauda arvensis), where males showed no
‘dear enemy’ effect during settlement and pair formation early in
the breeding season, reduced levels of aggression against
neighbours but not strangers in the middle of the breeding season,
while aggression towards neighbours increased again later when
fledglings became independent [113]. This indicates that the ‘dear
enemy’ effect is not linked to familiarity with neighbours per se, but
that the presence of offspring, potentially extra-pair, might cause it
(20% of offspring in the skylark population were extra-pair [113]).
There are two additional twists following from our hypothesis.
First, the dear enemy effect is predicted mainly in the model where
territories combine breeding and resources, which was found also
in a literature review [112]. Second, our theory predicts that males
should reduce aggression against neighbours more than females
would, and in the same review the ‘dear enemy’ effect was shown
most often in males, sometimes in both sexes, and only rarely in
females only [112].
Prediction: Extra-pair paternity is correlated with
predation risk. Females may not be equally successful in
recruiting a cooperative network under all conditions. Low
predation risk might reduce extra-pair mating and male-male
cooperation through two routes. Firstly, the expected benefit from
male-male protection might be low when there are few predators
(model for collective vigilance and defence), which would reduce
the incentive for females to engage in extra-pair mating in the first
place. Secondly, the expected longevity of males will likely be
higher when predation is low, and males may then reduce current
reproductive investments and prioritize future breeding attempts if
extra-pair paternity levels are high. The prediction of reduced
extra-pair paternity at low mortality rates has been documented in
literature reviews [62,114] but is also a prediction from theory that
does not consider cooperative benefits [88].
Individuals might show flexible behaviours or mating strategies
in response to perceived predation risk. When exposed to stuffed
predators, willingness to engage in mobbing and other cooperative
behaviours was increased in pied flycatchers (Ficedula hypoleuca)
[115,116], but it remains to be seen whether this may also
correlate with extra-pair mating behaviour.
Prediction: Extra-pair paternity is correlated with
breeding density. It follows from our hypothesis that a positive
within-species relationship between breeding density and extra-
pair mating can be expected, as has been observed for several
species [109,117,118]. Figure 4B shows increasing fitness with
increasing group size, indicating that if females can choose where
to settle they might prefer dense neighbourhoods. In species where
males settle first, this may lead males to choose territories within
aggregations because they attain higher mating success. A positive
correlation between breeding density and extra-pair mating has
been documented within some bird species [1,119,120], but not
between species [92,119]. Such correlations may arise through
several mechanisms, for example, extra-pair mating has been
viewed as a cost of sociality and not a cause for it, exemplified by
the ‘opportunity hypothesis’ where extra-pair mating is more
common in dense breeding aggregations because females interact
with more potential mates [80]. Related is the ‘hidden lek’
hypothesis [121], suggesting a female preference for breeding in
aggregations because it allows them to better compare male
quality. From both these hypotheses one would expect strong
mating skew in breeding aggregations, but studies on birds often
suggest a more equal partitioning of extra-pair offspring, in line
with our hypothesis. No reproductive skew was found in
aggregations of least flycatchers (Empidonax minimus) [122], but
direct effects in the form of more alarm calling [123] or lower
predation rates in central nests was found in some studies [124]
although not all [125]. In yellowthroat warblers (Geothlypis trichas)
there was lower variance in male reproductive success in dense
breeding areas [61]. Interestingly, there was increased production
of both within-pair and extra-pair young in dense neighbourhoods
[61]. In bank swallows large colonies had positive effects on
offspring survival because predator mobbing was more efficient
[82]. It would be interesting to see further comparisons of
cooperative behaviours and extra-pair mating between high- and
low-density breeding sites.
Prediction: Sex-specific division of labour. As a conse-
quence of extra-pair mating a male’s fitness incentives are spread
across the neighbourhood whereas a female still has all her
offspring in the nest. The distinction between maternity certainty
and paternity uncertainty suggests a new evolutionary basis for
sex-specific division of labour, where we predict that males are
more likely to cooperate towards public goods than females. It has
been noted that mobbing often is performed predominantly by
males [60,84], but none of the adaptive reasons for predator
mobbing listed by Curio [54] provide adequate explanations for
why there should be sex-specificity. A particularly interesting
example of male-male cooperation is the calling network among
red-winged blackbird males [53]. Using seven different call types,
males continuously echo the background call they hear from other
males to signal that all is clear [52], but change signal if there is
danger or disturbance. The new signal is picked up and repeated
over the entire neighbourhood, and due to this vigilance network
females can forage more efficiently [126]. Song matching,
whereby males incorporate elements of neighbours’ songs in their
own, is also known from other songbirds [127] and may serve a
similar function. From this perspective it makes evolutionary sense
that alarm calls uttered by females more often are directed at her
offspring to make them hide or be silent, whereas alarm calls by
males more often are broadcast wider [128].
Prediction: Cooperative behaviours are extra common
during breeding. Lima [48] reviewed anti-predator behaviours
in breeding birds and noted that cooperative behaviours are
abundant but that most are diffuse, have received little attention,
and are poorly understood. This is puzzling, given that sociality
and cooperative behaviours are particularly difficult to explain
during breeding as birds often are territorial and compete for
mates and resources.
Studies on red-winged blackbirds [129] and great tits (Parus
major) [130,131] found positive effects of breeding with familiar
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neighbours, i.e. between individuals who had been neighbours also
during a previous breeding season. These studies further suggested
that the positive effect may be related to cooperative behaviours in
the neighbourhood. In both species, familiar neighbours were
more likely to join in predator mobbing [129,130]. In great tits,
the strongest effects on reproduction occurred when a female had
many familiar male neighbours, that is, between the individuals
who ‘seal the deal’ over extra-pair mating and cooperative
investment also in our model [131]. In addition, there was a
small positive effect on nest success (avoidance of nest predation) if
also the neighbourhood males were familiar with each other.
Systemic effects and future directions
This paper presents a simple mechanism with far-reaching
consequences: where maternity certainty incentivizes each female
to focus care towards offspring in her social nest, paternity
uncertainty and a potential for offspring in several nests incentivize
males to invest in communal benefits and public goods. In this
section we evaluate some of the systemic effects of our hypothesis
and consequences beyond birds and beyond social monogamy.
Extra-pair mating in the light of kin selection. Kin
selection theory [8,20,132] often considers relatedness between
breeders or between breeders and helpers to explain evolutionarily
stable levels of cooperation. In this context, extra-pair mating
reduces relatedness in family groups and may therefore erode the
basis for cooperation [6,133]. Our models do not challenge the
result that cooperative breeding in kin groups becomes more
unstable with extra-group mating. Where we disagree is that this
would have effects for cooperation in general, an inference that
seems to follow e.g. from Cornwallis et al. [6] using ‘cooperative
breeding’, for which their conclusion is valid, interchangeably with
‘cooperation’, which is a much broader phenomenon.
In our models patterns of relatedness emerge from mating
strategies [134] so that the distribution of kin differs between male
and female breeders. Although this alters incentives and pay-offs
towards favouring male-male cooperation, the invasion analyses
emphasize how male-male interactions are flavoured both by
conflict over fertilizing mom’s babies as well as cooperation to
benefit dad’s ‘maybes’ wherever in the neighbourhood they might
be.
Synergy with other mechanisms for evolution of
cooperation. Cooperation theory has extended the parameter
region in which cooperation can be stable by including biologically
plausible mechanisms such as individual recognition [11] or lack
thereof [135], interaction networks [13], individual variation
[136], assortative interactions [14], choice of cooperative partner
[16,137], social standing [15], self-regard [138], and reward or
punishment [139]. Our models differ from classic cooperation
models by allowing the cooperative investment to be a continuous
trait [135,137], by letting pay-offs be gradual and emerge from
ecological interactions, and by including several types of players
that differ in their characteristics and motivation. This adds
ecological realism to cooperation models [22], but was also
essential for understanding that cooperative dynamics may
underlie an ecologically well-studied problem such as extra-pair
mating.
Although reciprocity, kin selection, and group-level selection are
not included in our models, these mechanisms may act in synergy
with extra-pair mating and make it easier for cooperation to evolve
to the high levels observed in breeding populations. In principle, a
small effect of ‘good genes’ or infertility insurance could favour an
initially low rate of female extra-pair mating, which could trigger
and entrain selection towards cooperative behaviours and higher
extra-pair mating. If males can recognize extra-pair offspring or
divert attention to nests that more likely contain them, the
behavioural interactions become less diffuse and more reciprocal
[44,115]. If males signal cooperativeness and females base their
choice of extra-pair mates on such a signal, then competitive
altruism may add momentum to the evolution of cooperation
[16,137]. Once established, female extra-pair mating and male-
male cooperation could spread through group-level selection [10].
It is interesting to note that among birds, relative brain size, which
could be relevant for individual recognition of cooperative
partners or for manoeuvring the complex behavioural games
when extra-pair mating is involved, is correlated with social
monogamy but not with genetic monogamy [140].
Individual differences: A methodological challenge but
evolutionarily potent. Our models do not include individual
differences among males or among females, but in the wild
individuals differ from each other in age, experience, condition,
plumage, parasite load, etc. Obviously, these differences may lead
to variation in reproductive success and context- or state-
dependent mating strategies.
With no individual variation, the models predict an equal share
of paternity among males and an equal share of cooperative
benefits to all females and their offspring. With variation in
individual characteristics these patterns will likely change, but to
predict the direction is not straightforward. Assume that males
vary in their resource holding power, then males capable of
defending rich territories may obtain a higher share of extra-pair
matings than the average male in his neighbourhood, and
individual differences may be a source of variation in male
reproductive success. In contrast, differences may equalize among
females, as females with poor mates or territories may gain access
to additional resources and protection through extra-pair mating.
There is also increasing awareness of how variation in individual
quality may mask trade-offs or relationships between individual
performance across traits [141], as some individuals excel in pretty
much everything [142] or because motivation differs [143,144].
With individual differences, a basis for mate preferences arises.
If females actively seek extra-pair mates who invest more heavily
in cooperation, this may enhance or stabilize cooperative
investments in public goods [16,137]. Females not only benefit
from cooperative extra-pair males, but also from care-giving social
mates, which may cause females to prefer different traits in extra-
pair compared to social mates [145]. Finally, there may be conflict
between choosing a care-giving social partner and choosing a
cooperative neighbourhood for breeding, as cooperative males
may settle assortatively to boost the effects of their cooperative
investments.
Relevance beyond birds and social monogamy. To
extend the relevance to other taxa there is a need to consider
taxon-specific differences in reproductive physiology and the mode
of fertilization. In fish, fertilization is most often external, which
allows the male to better assess paternity as he can know whether
he released gametes in proximity of the spawning female and often
whether other males were around too. With higher paternity
certainty males can identify conditions when it is safe to invest in
care for a single brood, and exclusively paternal care is widespread
among fish [146]. One interesting manipulation of paternity
spread in fish is found in the cichlid Julidochromis transcriptus. Here
females spawn in wedges between rocks and so use the topography
of the environment to distribute paternity: large males who
provide safety only can fertilize the outer eggs whereas the
innermost eggs can only be reached by a much smaller male, who
later cares for the brood [147].
With internal fertilization there is greater paternity uncertainty
but it also allows a greater share of the parental investment to be
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physiologically linked to the female. Internal fertilization in fish is
often related to live-bearing and having big offspring with little
direct care from males. Female birds produce large eggs while
males may share incubation and subsequent feeding and
protection until fledging. In mammals the period of exclusively
maternal care is further prolonged by lactation, and male
provisioning of dependent young is much rarer. Interestingly,
the prevalence of multi-male mating for viviparous species is
roughly the same when comparing fishes to mammals to reptiles
[68] and to birds [1].
In birds, the combination of paternity uncertainty and only
limited reproductive investment being inextricably linked to
female physiology pave the way for social monogamy where
males and females may share several of the tasks involved in
reproduction. In contrast, investments are often split temporally in
fish where females produce eggs while males may provide care, or
by task in mammals where males may help with vigilance or
defence but not so often with direct offspring provisioning or care
[56,148].
The considerations above imply that the core mechanism of
paternity uncertainty and male-male cooperation may actually be
reversed in fish. In the many species with external fertilization and
where males build nests and brood eggs, our theory suggests that
when females lay eggs in several nests they gain diffuse maternity
incentives across the neighbourhood.
In primates and humans males hunt and share large game and
engage in vigilance [83], warfare, and defence [56,149]; activities
that all resemble public goods. In some human societies there are
even cultural practices by which extra-pair mating is ritualized
following communal work days [150] or collective hunting [151],
suggesting that extra-pair mating may have influenced evolution of
cooperation and sociality in our own species.
The right end-point of Figures 1A and 4A are analogous to
group breeding as paternities in each nest are divided evenly
among the breeding males. Among primates there are many
group-living species with frequent multi-male mating and pater-
nity spread. In these, within-group mating may enable peaceful
and productive group dynamics by favouring male cooperative
behaviours [56,89]. The logic of our mechanism may even be
extended to extra-group mating to obtain between-group friend-
liness [56,152,153].
The privileged status of genetic explanations for female choice,
suggested by Darwin [154] and canonized by Trivers [24], may
have led to a historical downplay of ecological benefits as a
possible explanation for extra-pair mating. Our suggested mech-
anism reinstates ecology and direct benefits in this perspective, and
links variation in predation risk or breeding habitat to differences
in male and female competitive and cooperative behaviours. By
redistributing paternity and fitness incentives across a neighbour-
hood, female-driven extra-pair mating may have been a central
step towards evolution of the high levels of cooperation observed
in many species. In addition to being a mechanism for the
evolution of cooperation, our model suggests that extra-pair
mating may also be driving the evolution of breeding aggregations,
and together cooperation and aggregation are cornerstones of
sociality. The theory presented here may thus provide one missing
step towards explaining the highly developed sociality, what is
often termed pro-sociality, in many primates and humans [89].
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